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ABSTRACT
This paper documents strong evidence for behavioral biases among Chicago Board of
Trade proprietary traders and investigates the effect these biases have on prices. Our
traders appear highly loss-averse, regularly assuming above-average afternoon risk to
recover from morning losses. This behavior has important short-term consequences
for afternoon prices, as losing traders actively purchase contracts at higher prices
and sell contracts at lower prices than those that prevailed previously. However, the
market appears to distinguish these risk-seeking trades from informed trading. Prices
set by loss-averse traders are reversed significantly more quickly than those set by
unbiased traders.
A NUMBER OF RECENT PAPERS in the finance literature have proposed behavioral
theories to account for asset pricing anomalies.1 To provide support for their
models’ assumptions about investor behavior, these papers draw heavily on
the experimental psychology literature, in which evidence of cognitive biases
is abundant. On the one hand, behavioralists contend that this evidence has
been important in prompting researchers to consider heterodox explanations
of market anomalies. On the other hand, skeptics argue that there exists so
much of such evidence that behavioralists can “psycho-mine” the experimental
psychology literature to find support for the particular set of assumptions that
allow their models to match otherwise anomalous data. Contributing to the
skeptics’ argument, many of the behavioral theories rely on biases that are
quite different from each other and often produce opposite conclusions about
investor behavior. Not surprisingly, strong demand has emerged for empirical
work that identifies which of the biases, if any, influences investor decisions.
Even stronger is the demand to determine whether these biases are merely a
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curious aspect of certain market participants’ behavior or whether they have
important consequences for prices. This paper supplies evidence about both of
these issues.
Empirical tests of behavioral models face a number of challenges. First, the
models cannot be easily tested with aggregate data. As noted by Campbell
(2000), “[Behavioral models] cannot be tested using aggregate consumption or
the market portfolio because rational utility-maximizing investors neither con-
sume aggregate consumption (some is accounted for by nonstandard investors)
nor hold the market portfolio (instead they shift in and out of the stock mar-
ket)” (p. 1551). As a result, testing behavioral models is quite difficult without
detailed information on the trading behavior of market participants. Unfortu-
nately, given the issues of confidentiality associated with such data, availability
of such information is generally quite low. An additional difficulty is that an
investor’s horizon, while highly ambiguous in most empirical settings, repre-
sents a key dimension in behavioral models. For instance, when fund managers
are averse to losses, it is not clear whether their aversion relates to returns at
the monthly, quarterly, or annual horizons, or even whether they view losses on
positions taken recently as equivalent to losses on positions entered into years
ago. Finally, even if biases can be identified in investor behavior, to demonstrate
that this is more than just instances of noise trading, empirical tests must be
positioned to identify a link between biases in individual trader behavior and
overall prices.2
In this paper, we conduct a series of tests to determine the importance of
behavioral biases in the price-setting process. Our tests focus on the trading
behavior of market makers in the Treasury Bond futures contract at the Chicago
Board of Trade (CBOT). This environment offers a number of unique advan-
tages in assessing behavioral biases and any consequences they might have for
prices.
First, since each of the traders we study trades on the order of $200 million
worth of contracts per day, and, as a group, take part in over 95% of all trades,
any biases in their trading behavior have a reasonable prospect of showing up
in prices. While several papers have uncovered evidence of behavioral biases
in the trading activity of various sets of investors, almost no evidence exists
for biases in investor behavior when significant amounts of capital are on the
line.3 Thus, if behavioral biases are suspected of playing a price-setting role in
large, liquid capital markets, then only an examination of traders that transact
with significant capital at stake is likely to yield evidence thereof. The idea
that professional traders may play an important role in distorting asset prices
in large capital markets has been argued, most recently, by Allen (2001).
2 Odean (1999), who studies transaction data for clients of a large discount brokerage and uncov-
ers strong and widespread evidence of overconfidence, offers an important start in this direction.
A key question raised by the findings is whether the individuals’ overconfident behavior impacts
prices.
3 For example, the overconfident investors studied by Odean (1999) place, on average, 1.4 trades
per year worth around $11,000 each.
Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices? 3
A second benefit of our setting is that, because we begin with every transac-
tion made by the market makers in the T-Bond pit over a 1-year period (over
5 million transactions), we have significant power to detect biases in trading be-
havior. This power is aided by the fact that our traders are full-time proprietary
traders trading on personal accounts, whose behavior is therefore undistorted
by agency or career concerns issues, who are not trading to satisfy hedging
needs, and whose livelihood depends entirely on their ability to trade effectively.
Because our traders are market makers, and do not trade through brokers or
other intermediaries, they are far more proximate to the price-setting process.
As a result, relative to other market participants, any impact their trading
biases have on prices is likely to be more pronounced and therefore easier to
detect.
The final benefit of our focus on CBOT market makers is that the relevant
horizon is quite clear. While in most settings the horizon over which investor
performance is evaluated is ambiguous, CBOT market makers have clear in-
centives and mechanisms encouraging them to evaluate their performance on a
daily basis. The traders receive and review statements at the end of each trad-
ing day detailing their performance during the day. Because most trades are
unwound by the end of the day, and traders seldom retain significant positions
overnight, all profits or losses during a day can be attributed to trades executed
on that particular day. Since the market makers’ focus is on reading the order
flow, which conveys highly short-lived signals regarding future trading activity,
they carry little informational advantage from one day to the next. As a result,
the statements CBOT market makers receive at the close of the trading day
can be viewed as perfect report cards on their day at work.
Our study tests the null hypothesis of standard, rational investor behavior
against a number of popular, though potentially competing, alternative behav-
ioral hypotheses, including self-attribution bias, representativeness bias, the
house-money effect, and loss aversion. We argue that if traders overly attribute
past trading success to their own ability, if traders view past trading profits
as overly representative of future trading opportunities, or if traders are more
willing to assume risk when gambling with the “house’s money,” they will take
greater risks as their profits grow. If traders are averse to losses incurred at
the daily horizon, this will lead to the opposite result: Traders will take fewer
risks as they become profitable. Our setting allows us to study self-attribution
bias, representativeness bias, and the house-money effect on the one hand, and
loss aversion on the other, in an environment in which they yield opposite pre-
dictions regarding the relationship between realized profits and subsequent
risk-taking.
To examine this relationship, we simply split the trading day into two peri-
ods and test whether traders with profitable mornings increase or reduce their
afternoon risk-taking. We find strong evidence that CBOT traders are highly
loss averse: They are far more likely to take on additional afternoon risk follow-
ing morning losses than following morning gains. In our sample, a trader with
morning losses has a 31.2% chance of taking above-average risk in the after-
noon, compared to a trader who earns a profit in the morning, who has only a
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27.0% chance. Thus, a losing trader is 15.5% more likely to take above-average
afternoon risk than a winning trader. This result shows up robustly across
most of our tests, including pooled OLS regressions, panel regressions, and
Fama–MacBeth style averages of trader-by-trader (time series) or day-by-day
(cross-sectional) regression coefficients. The result is also robust to employing
alternate measures of risk: Losing traders are 17.4% more likely to place an
above-average number of afternoon trades and are 9.5% more likely to trade at
above-average sizes.
Next, to see whether the traders’ loss aversion has an impact on prices, we
examine whether our traders are more likely to move afternoon prices following
morning losses. Although the T-Bond market makers typically wait for other
traders to take the other side of their bid or offer (and thereby gain an edge
relative to other market participants), they will on occasion take the other
side of the bid or offer of other traders and thereby move the price. Specifi-
cally, we identify traders as “marginal” or “price-setting” if they purchase at a
higher price or sell at a lower price than prevailed previously. For instance, if
the previous trade took place at 25, we identify a given market maker as the
marginal trader if he purchases at 26 or if he sells at 24. Our results clearly
demonstrate that traders are more likely to place such price-moving trades fol-
lowing morning losses. A trader who loses money in the morning is around
15% more likely to execute such a trade than a trader who makes money
in the morning. Overall, while traders lose money 32.9% of the time, losing
traders account for 38% of all afternoon price-setting trades placed by market
makers.
To gauge the quality of prices set by traders with morning losses and to assess
how permanently they move prices, we monitor the average price change that
follows a price-setting trade. If the marginal prices set by losing traders persist
for a significant period of time, their loss-averse behavior may have permanent
consequences for prices. If the prices do not revert quickly, it suggests that such
trading is not so costly to the loss-averse traders—i.e. they are able to create
their own space.4 If, on the other hand, prices revert strongly to previous levels,
this raises doubts about the potential importance of loss aversion in influencing
prices over the longer term. The magnitude of the reversal in prices set by
losing traders offers a measure of the costs associated with their loss-averse
behavior. Our results indicate significant reversals of price changes made by
loss-averse traders. During the 5 minutes following a price-setting trade, a
trader attempting to take on additional risk sees prices revert 27% more if he
experienced morning losses than if he experienced gains. This suggests that the
price-setting trades of locals with morning losses have far less permanent an
influence than the average price-setting local trade. This finding is consistent
with the arguments made by Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965) against the
importance of noise traders in the price formation process.
4 This relates to studies investigating the long-run survival of noise traders, such as De Long
et al. (1990), who demonstrate that noise traders can create risk that is priced and prosper in
assuming this risk.
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Our final set of results examines whether prices exhibit greater volatility
on afternoons that follow mornings when trader losses are widespread. This
inquiry is closely related to the work of Shiller (1981, 1989), who attributes
excess volatility in asset prices to patterns in human behavior. Consistent with
the above results, our evidence suggests that loss aversion helps account for the
short-term volatility of afternoon prices, but cannot account for volatility mea-
sured over longer horizons. Following mornings during which overall losses are
one standard deviation larger than usual, expected afternoon volatility mea-
sured at the 1-second frequency increases by 11.5%. As volatility is measured
over longer periods, however, the effect of morning losses disappears. For in-
stance, at the 10-minute horizon, the increase in expected volatility drops to
6.4% and loses statistical significance. However, our volatility results are not
entirely conclusive, since we do not have a sufficiently long time series to ex-
plore the volatility hypothesis with much power.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we discuss a variety of behavioral
biases and their implications for the daily horizon trade setting. In Section II,
we outline our data and tests. Section III presents the results of our tests for the
existence of behavioral biases among CBOT traders. Section IV examines the
price impact of the biases identified in Section III, and Section V concludes.
I. Behavioral Biases among Professional Traders
To explain deviations from market efficiency, behavioral models must take a
stand on what form of irrationality is behind investor behavior. For guidance,
they often turn to evidence from the experimental psychology literature. This
has led to the employment of a wide variety of biases in behavioral finance
theory (see Barberis and Thaler (2003) or Hirshleifer (2001) for reviews of the
literature). Following Barberis and Thaler (2003), we can classify these devia-
tions from rationality as either biases in beliefs or biases in preferences. Since
our study examines deviations from rationality by focusing on the relationship
between profits and subsequent risk-taking activity across the trading day, it
is worth identifying what predictions various biases in beliefs or preferences
that have been employed in the literature yield for our setting.
A. Biases in Beliefs
As CBOT market makers trade, beliefs emerge as they interpret a variety
of private signals related to the pit order flow. How profitably market makers
trade in response to these signals, by adjusting their quotes and managing their
positions, depends both on their interpretation of the signals and on luck. Profits
and subsequent risk-taking activity may be related across the trading day if
signal quality varies in a predictable way from day to day. In particular, if certain
days have above-average signal quality, market makers might rationally decide
to take more risk than usual following profitable mornings.
However, biases in beliefs emerge across the trading day if market makers
systematically misinterpret these signals. One bias that has been employed in
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the literature is that of self-attribution (e.g., Daniel et al. (1998) and Gervais
and Odean (2001)). A number of papers in experimental psychology, including
Langer and Roth (1975) and Miller and Ross (1975), document that people take
credit for past success and attribute past failure to bad luck. In our setting, if
traders exhibit biased self-attribution, a trader who executes profitable trades
becomes overconfident in his ability to interpret the order flow signals. Such
a trader overly attributes the profits of his trades to his interpretation of the
order flow signals and insufficiently attributes the profits to luck, taking more
risk when his recent trades have been profitable.5
A second set of biases in beliefs that have been employed in the literature is
that of representativeness and conservativeness. Experimental psychologists
find that people tend to rely too heavily on small samples (to view them as
overly representative of the underlying population) and rely too little on large
samples (to update their priors too conservatively).6 Barberis et al. (1998) model
investor sentiment in a setting in which investors at times overweight new
information relative to priors (representativeness) and at times underweight
new information (conservativeness). In our setting, if traders afflicted with a
representativeness bias view morning trading conditions as overly reflective of
those they can expect to face in the afternoon, profitable mornings are followed
by amplified afternoon risk-taking. Conservativeness bias, on the other hand,
attenuates any positive relation between morning profits and afternoon risk-
taking, should one exist.
Thus, in our setting, both rational beliefs and beliefs with biases may lead to
a positive relation between profits and subsequent risk-taking. However, other
than the presence of (or belief in) extreme negative autocorrelation in profit
opportunities, beliefs are unlikely to yield a negative relation between profits
and subsequent risk-taking.
B. Biases in Preferences
The literature has also employed preference-based deviations from rational-
ity. Most of these are based on the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), where utility functions are derived as convex in the region of losses,
kinked at zero, and concave in the region of gains. From this theory, a variety
of biases emerge relative to individuals whose behavior is consistent with the
Von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms.
Perhaps the most salient feature of prospect theory is that of extreme risk
aversion in the neighborhood of zero.7 Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis
et al. (2001) model the behavior of a representative investor with such pref-
erences and generate implications that help account for the equity premium
5 However, in the Gervais and Odean (2001) model, self-attribution bias tends to attenuate with
experience. Thus, there may be reasons to expect the degree of self-attribution bias among a set of
professional traders to be modest.
6 See, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1971, 1974) and Kahneman and Tversky (1973).
7 Using experimental data, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) estimate the slope below zero to be
2.25 times that above zero.
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puzzle. For a trader whose utility is a function of daily gains or losses, a kink at
zero implies that profits near zero will lead to extremely high subsequent risk
aversion.
A second aspect of prospect theory is that of risk-seeking behavior in the
region of losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) characterize such behavior in
the following terms, “[A] person who has not made peace with his losses is likely
to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise” (p. 287).8 In
our setting, this suggests that traders who have experienced losses are most
inclined to take subsequent risks. Conversely, traders with profitable mornings
reduce their exposure to afternoon risk.
However, not all biases in preferences predict a negative relation. The house-
money effect, documented in Thaler and Johnson (1990), finds that individuals
have increasing risk tolerance as their wealth exceeds the reference point.9 The
house-money effect is employed by Barberis et al. (2001), who model investors as
becoming more risk tolerant when their risky asset holdings earn returns that
exceed a historical benchmark. In our setting, traders who have earned profits
in the morning that exceed some benchmark level become less risk averse in
the afternoon because they feel they are “gambling with the house money.”
Thus, biases in preferences can predict either a positive or a negative relation
between profits and subsequent risk-taking.
C. Identifying Behavioral Biases
While none of the behavioral biases that we consider has been documented
among professional market makers, it seems plausible that these professionals
might exhibit any or all of these characteristics. If traders do exhibit multiple
biases, our tests will help us determine which biases are the most economically
significant. For example, it is plausible that market makers exhibit both loss
aversion and the house-money effect, but that the benchmark level above which
the house-money effect is important is sufficiently high that loss aversion is
much easier to detect in the data.
Moreover, as Barberis and Thaler (2003) note, in testing behavioral theories,
identifying the appropriate horizon is critical. A mismatch between the horizon
used by investors to evaluate their performance and that assumed in a test
design may result in failure to detect biases present in the data. In experimental
psychology, most of the important findings of irrationality are documented over
extremely short horizons—subjects are rarely tested for more than a single
day. In the finance literature, behavioral assumptions have been employed to
account for both short- and long-horizon investor behavior. As discussed above,
we view a 1-day horizon to be most relevant for our set of traders—they receive
8 ESPN’s Bill Simmons offers the following analogy: “Hey, did you notice that the Red Sox picked
up Tony Clark (and his $7 million contract) off waivers last week? [Red Sox GM] Dan Duquette is
like a blackjack player who’s down $700 and realizes that he has to leave the casino in 20 minutes,
so he starts making $100 bets” (11/03/01).
9 Thaler and Johnson (1990) argue that whether individuals exhibit risk-seeking over losses or
house money depends on how they edit and encode the gambles that they consider.
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statements to evaluate their performance at the end of each day, they generally
enter the trading day with no outstanding positions, and they evaluate signals
that are unlikely to be useful across trading days. However, it is important to
note that biases relevant over longer horizons may not be detected by our tests.
It is also important to note that there are several ways that preferences con-
sistent with expected utility theory can deliver a relation between profits and
subsequent risk-taking. First, if wealth effects are important—i.e., if morning
gains and losses significantly alter the local curvature of our traders’ indirect
utility functions—and if traders have declining absolute risk aversion, then
traders that have become notably wealthier from morning trading become less
risk-averse in the afternoon.
Second, if margin constraints are important, morning profits influence the
amount of risk traders are willing and/or allowed to take in the afternoon.
Traders who find themselves near their margin constraint following a losing
morning may be inclined to reduce their risk-taking to avoid a margin call.
Conversely, traders who are below their margin constraint may be inclined to
increase their afternoon risk-taking to get above the margin constraint before
they are forced to liquidate.
Finally, if career or reputation concerns are important to our traders, their
conditional risk-taking across the trading day is likely to resemble that of mu-
tual fund managers across the calendar year, as documented by Chevalier and
Ellison (1997). They find that mutual fund managers who have underperformed
the market through the third quarter of a given year will face a convex rela-
tionship between their fourth quarter performance and the net flow of capital
into their mutual fund during the subsequent year. For managers who have
outperformed, the relationship is concave. Chevalier and Ellison then demon-
strate that the fund managers respond appropriately to these incentives—they
increase the riskiness of their portfolios if they are underperforming and they
lower the riskiness of their portfolios if they are outperforming. To the extent
that traders are compensated in a similar nonlinear way as a function of their
daily trading profits, one might expect them to exhibit increased afternoon
risk-taking following losing mornings and to lower their afternoon risk-taking
following profitable mornings. To mitigate the potential effects of such agency
considerations, our tests are conducted solely using traders who trade on their
own personal accounts. In this way, our focus is on traders whose daily com-
pensation corresponds exactly to their net gain or loss from trading each day.
To summarize, our null hypothesis is that afternoon risk is unrelated to
morning profits. If markets are efficient, traders are rational, traders have
Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions, and wealth effects are negligi-
ble, margin constraints are unimportant, traders’ compensation and reputa-
tional concerns are neutral, and profit opportunities are uncorrelated across
the trading day, then we should expect no relationship between morning re-
turns and afternoon risk-taking. Self-attribution bias, the representativeness
heuristic, and the house-money effect all generate an alternative hypothesis
on one side of the null: that morning returns will be positively related to after-
noon risk-taking. Risk-seeking in losses predicts the null will be rejected in the
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other direction: that morning returns will be negatively related to afternoon
risk-taking.
II. Data and Method
Our primary data consist of the entire history of transactions (audit trail
data) from the CBOT T-Bond futures pit during all of 1998.10 The data include
identifiers for the buying trader and the selling trader, the price, and the time
for each transaction. They also include a code indicating whether each trade is
performed on behalf of a customer, on behalf of the trader’s clearing firm, on
behalf of another trader, or for a trader’s personal account. Our data include
records of over five million futures transactions, 97.4% of which involve front-
month contracts, which are the focus of our tests. In 96.6% of the front-month
futures transactions in our data, at least one of the two traders is trading on
his personal account. There are 1,082 different traders in the data. Looking at
how frequently each trader trades for his own account, we identify 426 local
traders. Each of our locals executes at least 1,500 trades for his personal ac-
count, and trades bond futures on at least 100 days over the course of the year.
We track each local’s trades placed on their personal account and the associated
inventories and profits throughout each trading session.
Since our hypotheses relate the risk that a trader takes to his profitability, it
is important for us to measure both profits and risks correctly. To measure each
trader’s profits and inventory, we assume that each trader closes out his posi-
tions at the end of each day and thus begins each day with no position. This as-
sumption is supported by the evidence of Kolb (1991), Kuserk and Locke (1993),
and Manaster and Mann (1996), and has been used previously in Manaster and
Mann, and Coval and Shumway (2001). As Manaster and Mann point out, since
traders carry little overnight informational advantage, substantial overnight
margin funding costs typically discourage them from carrying overnight posi-
tions. Of course, some noise is present in our calculations to the extent that
traders close out positions during evening trading sessions, hedge their posi-
tions using options contracts,11 or place their trades through other locals.12
Assuming that there is no beginning inventory makes profit calculations sim-
ple. We multiply the difference between purchase and sales prices by quantities
to arrive at a profit figure for each local at each point in time. However, to the
extent that we have errors in our inventory measures, they tend to accumulate
across the trading day. To account for this possibility, we put inventory controls
in most of our regressions and we Winsorize all variables that depend on inven-
tory at the 1st and 99th percentile levels.13 Since our hypotheses require us to
10 The data was obtained from the CFTC via a Freedom of Information Act filing.
11 Though, as Manaster and Mann note, such activity is rare.
12 Overall, on about 65% of our trader-day observations, the trader appears to finish the day
trading session with an absolute inventory of 10 contracts or less. However, the ability of one
trader to trade on behalf of another trader makes it difficult to calculate this number precisely.
13 That is, all observations of variables depending on inventory that are in the 1st or 99th per-
centiles are set to the level of the 1st and 99th percentile cutoffs, respectively.
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have a profit figure available at a particular time each day, we add the market
value of any inventory, calculated as the current price times the contracts out-
standing, and add this to each local’s running profit figure to generate a total
profit variable for any time of the day.
Measuring the risk each trader takes is less straightforward. Certainly the
number of trades a trader places and the average size of these trades is related
to risk he assumes. However, since the level of risk in the T-Bond contract is
nonconstant across the trading day, estimating each trader’s risk requires an
estimate of the risk a given position exposes the trader to at different points
during a particular day. Therefore, we use historical price change data to model
the level of risk throughout the trading day. Using second-by-second price data
(time and sales data) from the Futures Industry Institute Data Center, we
calculate the front-month futures contract price at the beginning of each minute
of each day from 1989 to 1998. These prices are used to calculate the absolute
price change from one minute to the next.
To measure the risk a given position faces during the trading day, we employ
an ordered logit regression (as in Coval and Shumway (2001)). A logit function of
the probability of various potential absolute price changes over the next minute
is regressed on the magnitude of price changes in the preceding 5 minutes and
time-of-day dummy variables for each 5-minute period during the trading day.
The fitted values from this regression are then used to construct an expected
absolute price change for each minute of each full trading day in 1998. Since
our risk measure is an expected absolute price change, it roughly corresponds
to a one standard deviation measure of price change risk associated with each
1-minute interval.
Finally, a trader’s risk is calculated by multiplying each minute’s risk mea-
sure by the trader’s position at the beginning of the minute, and adjusting the
trader’s risk for the minute by any changes in inventory, and therefore risk, that
occur during the minute. Again, our measure is roughly the standard deviation
of wealth the trader assumed during a given minute. We then can calculate the
cumulative risk a trader has assumed up to a given point each day by sum-
ming the measure of risk across all of the previous minutes. We term this risk
measure the total dollar risk. Although we view this to be the proper way to
measure trader-specific risk, we verify that our results are robust to employing
alternative risk measures, such as number of trades and average trade size.
III. Evidence of Behavioral Biases
This section details the evidence we obtain from our first hypothesis, that
locals at the CBOT exhibit behavioral biases. In particular, we examine the
relationship between each trader’s profits in the morning and the risk that
he takes in the afternoon. If profit opportunities are uncorrelated across the
trading day and wealth effects are negligible, any relationship between morn-
ing profits and afternoon risk-taking indicates that traders exhibit behavioral
biases.
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A. Summary Statistics
To examine whether CBOT locals exhibit loss aversion, we look at the relation
between morning trading performance and afternoon risk-taking. Since the
trading day at the CBOT begins at 7:20 a.m. and ends at 2:00 p.m., we split the
trading day into a morning period before 11:00 a.m. and an afternoon period
after 11:00 a.m. We round the midway point of the trading day (10:40 a.m.) to
11 a.m. because it is somewhat closer to the midway point of the average trader’s
lunch break. Then, for each trader, we calculate morning and afternoon profits,
and calculate morning and afternoon values for each of the three risk measures:
total dollar risk, number of trades, and average trade size. With morning and
afternoon profits and risks defined, we are almost ready to test our hypotheses.
We can examine our first hypothesis simply by relating the risk a trader
takes in the afternoon to the trader’s profit or loss in the morning. However,
because traders face margin constraints, results from simple regressions may
be misleading. If traders who experience large morning losses face binding
margin constraints, they may be forced to liquidate their holdings and assume
very little risk in the afternoon. Alternatively, if traders lose enough to trigger
constraints, but their trading is not immediately restricted, they may take an
inordinate amount of risk in hope that they can win back enough to avoid
margin calls.
To control for trader heterogeneity with respect to margin constraints and
risk tolerance in general, we normalize trader profits and risk-taking. To calcu-
late a given trader’s normalized morning profit, we first calculate the standard
deviation of the trader’s morning profits across all days of the sample and then
divide each of the trader’s morning profit observations by his profit standard
deviation. We denote our measure of the normalized morning profits of trader
i on date t as πMi,t . We conduct the same calculation to normalize traders’ after-
noon profits, πAi,t. We perform a similar calculation to normalize each trader’s
morning and afternoon risk. We calculate trader-specific means and standard
deviations for each of our risk measures across the mornings and afternoons
of our sample. We then demean each trader’s daily morning and afternoon risk
and divide them by their respective trader-specific standard deviations. We de-
note trader i’s normalized measure of afternoon risk on date t as RiskAi,t, where
RiskAi,t may be used to reflect trader i’s total dollar risk, total number of trades,
or average trade size on date t. Trader i’s normalized morning risk is denoted
as RiskMi,t. In this way, our profit measure and our three risk measures have
standard deviations of one for each trader during both the morning and the
afternoon. Although normalizations of trader profits and risk-taking are not
required for most of our results, because they control for heterogeneity across
traders, they allow for a more sensible economic interpretation of the results.14
14 For instance, a $5,000 morning loss means very different things to a trader who has never
lost more than $1,000 in a single day than to one who regularly experiences $5,000 swings in his
account.
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Table I
Summary Statistics
This table reports a number of summary statistics for the sample. The sample consists of the trading
experience of 426 local traders at the CBOT’s Treasury Bond Futures pit over 236 full trading days
during 1998. Summary statistics using raw trader data are reported for all trader days. Trader
data is normalized by trader for summary statistics of traders with profitable and losing mornings.
Panel A: Statistics by Trader-Day
Morning Afternoon
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev.
All Trader-Days (N = 82,595) Raw Data
Profits 1808.33 750.00 171848.13 661.78 187.50 113964.28
Number of trades 116.62 88.00 105.37 73.25 52.00 72.95
Average trade size 10.03 4.84 19.17 9.35 4.53 18.27
Total dollar risk 9641.46 1150.00 57540.27 10876.76 1242.83 75133.82
Price-setting trades 0.202 0.000 0.514 0.327 0.000 0.643
Traders with Profitable Mornings (N = 55,877) Normalized by Trader
Profits 0.467 0.276 0.574 0.095 0.067 0.733
Number of trades −0.035 −0.159 0.986 −0.066 −0.234 0.980
Average trade size −0.063 −0.222 0.967 −0.046 −0.213 0.989
Total dollar risk −0.122 −0.317 0.776 −0.100 −0.335 0.801
Price-setting trades −0.009 −0.188 0.601 −0.017 −0.128 0.467
Traders with Losing Mornings (N = 26,718) Normalized by Trader
Profits −0.563 −0.273 0.727 0.082 0.067 0.915
Number of trades 0.066 −0.065 1.013 0.124 −0.036 1.016
Average trade size 0.119 −0.081 1.040 0.086 −0.114 1.006
Total dollar risk 0.180 −0.146 0.993 0.141 −0.205 0.997
Price-setting trades 0.018 −0.171 0.619 0.036 −0.116 0.526
Panel B: Statistics by Day
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Afternoon price changes 621.8703 215.383 195.00 1582.00
Fraction with morning losses 0.3238 0.049 0.20 0.50
Fraction of loss-averse traders with losses 0.3305 0.055 0.19 0.50
Fraction of price-setting traders with losses 0.3230 0.051 0.19 0.49
In Table I, we report the mean, median, and standard deviation of morning
and afternoon measures of profits, total number of trades, average trade size,
total dollar risk, and number of price-setting trades (i.e., market orders). In
the top third of Panel A, the statistics are calculated using raw data across all
traders. The middle and bottom thirds of Panel A report statistics for traders
having experienced profitable and losing mornings, respectively. The statistics
reported in the middle and bottom thirds are calculated using the normalized
measures of profits and risk-taking described above, which are used in most
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of our subsequent tests.15 Panel B of Table I reports several market summary
statistics, including the number of afternoon price changes, the fraction of mar-
ket participants with morning losses on a given day, the average trader’s nor-
malized morning profits on a given day, and a daily fraction of traders with
morning profits, weighted by a trader-specific loss aversion coefficient described
in Section IV.C.
Several points emerge from Table I that are worth noting. First, our panel
of local trading days contains 82,595 observations. On the average (median)
trader-day, around $2,500 ($1,000) in profits is earned, 190 (140) trades are
placed, with a size of around 10 (4.5) lots each, and $20,000 ($2,400) of risk
(standard deviation in total trader wealth) is assumed. Clearly, the averages
are dominated by a small number of traders that trade in larger quantities,
assume significantly more risk, and earn larger profits.
Turning to the bottom two-thirds of Panel A, we see that in 67% of the local
trading days (55,877), the given local traded profitably during the morning. As
we see, on the average trader-morning, the winning trader’s profit is 0.467 stan-
dard deviations above zero. For losing traders, on the average trader-morning
they are 0.563 standard deviations below zero. These statistics are confirmed
by those in Panel B, which reports that on the average day, the average trader’s
profit is 0.135 standard deviations above 0 and 32.4% of the pit has experienced
losses. Next, we turn to our three measures of risk. Our hypotheses outlined
in Section I all make predictions regarding the relationship between morning
profits and afternoon risk-taking. When we take averages of observations as-
sociated with profitable and losing mornings, notice that the afternoon risk
measures are far higher following losing mornings than following profitable
mornings. Traders with losing mornings place far more trades (0.124 standard
deviations above their daily average versus −0.066), place trades with larger
average size (0.086 versus −0.046), and assume greater total dollar risk (0.141
versus −0.100) than those with profitable mornings. Moreover, the number
of afternoon price-setting trades is also significantly larger for traders with
morning losses, suggesting that losing traders are actively seeking out addi-
tional afternoon risk. This preliminary evidence suggests that traders exhibit
behavior consistent with the loss aversion hypothesis. They assume greater
risk following losing mornings and assume lower risk following profitable
mornings.
However, we can also see from Table I that traders with losing mornings
are not otherwise equivalent to traders with profitable mornings. They enter
the afternoon having assumed far greater morning risk. Traders with losing
mornings have placed 6.6% of one standard deviation more trades during the
morning than average. They have traded in size that is 11.9% of a standard
deviation above their average morning size. And they have assumed 18% of a
15 Because traders place relatively few price-setting trades per day, they are only demeaned by
traders in the middle and bottom third of Panel A.
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standard deviation more morning risk than usual. Thus, it is quite important
that we control for these factors in a regression setting.16
Looking at afternoon returns, we see that they are only slightly lower follow-
ing losing mornings than following profitable mornings (0.095 versus 0.082).
This suggests that the additional afternoon risk traders assume following los-
ing mornings is not costly from an expected return standpoint. However, since
traders with losing morning take more risk than other traders, afternoon re-
turns are considerably lower for losing traders in risk-adjusted terms or as a
fraction of the number of trades they place. Moreover, to the extent that traders
seek to increase the spread in their afternoon returns following morning losses
(e.g., due to loss aversion), we see that they are successful in achieving this
objective, as the standard deviation of their overall afternoon return is notably
larger following losing mornings than following winning mornings (0.915 ver-
sus 0.733). Now we turn to the regression setting to see whether these results
are significant and robust to controlling for other factors.
B. Morning Losses Lead to Afternoon Risk-Taking
In Table II, we present results of regressions of afternoon risk-taking on
morning profits. Included in the regressions are the absolute values of each
trader’s outstanding morning (11:00 a.m.) inventory, demeaned, and normal-
ized by each trader’s standard deviation of outstanding morning inventory. We
include normalized inventory for three reasons. First, as noted above, traders
with losing mornings tend to have larger outstanding positions heading into
the afternoon, and we would like to control for the additional afternoon risk
introduced by this position. Second, if traders do not begin each day with zero
inventory, including each trader’s absolute inventory may attenuate the bias
that results in our measurement of profit and risk. Finally, in order to account
for the possibility that traders unwind losing and winning positions in different
ways,17 we include a term interacting morning profits and morning inventory.
Specifically, our regression takes the following form:
RISKAi,t = α + βππMi,t + βI |INVMi,t | + βπ IπMi,t · |INVMi,t | + βRRISKMi,t + εi,t , (1)
where RISKAi,t is one of the three normalized afternoon measures of risk for
trader i on date t, πMi,t is trader i’s date t morning profit, |INVMi,t| is the absolute
value of trader i’s outstanding position (measured in thousands of contracts) at
the end of the morning on date t, RISKMi,t is trader i’s morning risk measure on
date t, and εi,t is the error term.
We estimate our regressions in a variety of ways. First, we estimate a simple
pooled-OLS regression. We also conduct regressions in the style of Fama and
16 Of course, it is possible that the morning measures of risk are large for traders with morning
losses because they have already become risk-seeking. Consistent with this, the regression results
that follow are far stronger when the morning risk and other controls are omitted.
17 This possibility is suggested by the findings of Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998a),
and Locke and Mann (1999).
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Table II
Morning Profits and Afternoon Risk-Taking
This table reports the results of a number of different regressions relating morning profits to afternoon
risk-taking by locals at the CBOT. All regressions have the basic form,
RISKAi,t = α + βππMi,t + βI
∣∣∣INVMi,t
∣∣∣ + βπ I πMi,t ·
∣∣∣INVMi,t
∣∣∣ + βRRISKMi,t + εi,t .
The t-statistics are in parentheses. Risk is measured in three different ways, as the number of afternoon
trades, the average size of afternoon trades, or the cumulative risk-weighted inventory of each trader. All
variables that depend on measures of inventory are Winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels. The standard
errors of the fixed-effects PCSE results are allowed to be heteroskedastic and concurrently correlated
across locals. In Panel D, only the top (i.e., most profitable) X% of all traders on a given day are included
in the regression, where X is the fraction of traders with losses on that day. In Panels A–C, the sample
contains 82,595 local-days. In Panel D the sample contains 65,061 local-days.
Method α βπ βI βπI βR
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Afternoon Number of Trades
Pooled OLS 0.0187 −0.1349 0.0313 0.056 0.2361
(4.88) (−23.38) (7.26) (12.99) (61.66)
FM by trader 0.0315 −0.1173 0.0511 0.058 0.2182
(2.35) (−4.62) (2.35) (7.49) (25.7)
FM by date −0.0143 −0.1874 0.0378 0.0588 0.1499
(−0.49) (−27.89) (7.27) (10.33) (23.3)
Fixed effects PCSE – −0.1362 0.03395 0.0547 0.2106
– (−17.90) (5.44) (11.36) (12.07)
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Afternoon Average Trade Size
Pooled OLS 0.0098 −0.0691 0.0606 0.0203 0.2159
(2.53) (−11.95) (13.67) (4.69) (54.89)
FM by trader −0.0045 −0.1013 0.0421 0.0227 0.2056
(−0.27) (−3.44) (1.41) (2.75) (23.79)
FM by date 0.0095 −0.1076 0.0582 0.0290 0.1726
(0.65) (−11.86) (9.31) (3.83) (27.58)
Fixed effects PCSE – −0.7061 0.0594 0.0189 0.1964
– (−11.16) (11.70) (4.18) (31.28)
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Afternoon Total Dollar Risk
Pooled OLS 0.0000 −0.0079 0.5802 0.0134 0.3001
(0.02) (−3.00) (195.70) (6.80) (98.2)
FM by trader 0.0015 −0.0107 0.6208 0.0170 0.2555
(1.55) (−2.41) (60.93) (4.27) (29.81)
FM by date −0.0007 −0.0161 0.5812 0.0235 0.2868
(−0.12) (−3.91) (63.97) (4.75) (39.98)
Fixed effects PCSE – −0.0091 0.5794 0.0139 0.2990
– (−2.77) (157.09) (6.34) (70.17)
Panel D: Dependent Variable: Afternoon Total Dollar Risk Matched
Percentiles of Winners and Losers
Pooled OLS −0.0003 −0.0078 0.5925 0.0139 0.2933
(−0.17) (−2.83) (181.63) (6.75) (87.31)
FM by trader −0.0001 −0.0095 0.6342 0.017 0.2501
(−0.1) (−2.1) (61.62) (4.31) (28.65)
FM by date −0.0014 −0.0151 0.593 0.0232 0.2811
(−0.22) (−3.57) (65.03) (4.64) (38.8)
Fixed effects PCSE – −0.0085 0.5913 0.0143 0.2927
– (−2.58) (147.79) (6.38) (63.92)
16 The Journal of Finance
MacBeth (1969) in which we conduct trader-by-trader regressions and average
the coefficients across traders, and we conduct day-by-day regressions and av-
erage the coefficients across days. The Fama–MacBeth regressions serve two
purposes. First, they check whether our results are driven by cross-sectional
or time-series correlation in residuals. Also, they test whether our results are
driven more by particular traders or by particular days. We also conduct the
panel regression with fixed effects for both traders and days and panel-corrected
standard errors.18 In Panel A, we report the results of these regressions with
the number of afternoon trades as the measure of afternoon risk-taking. Panel
B reports results of regressions using average trade size as the dependent vari-
able. Finally, in Panel C, we document the results using total dollar risk.
As we can see, consistent with the results presented in Table I, our regres-
sions indicate that traders are significantly loss averse. The results are highly
significant across most of the different specifications. The regressions indicate
that a one standard deviation decrease in morning profits leads the average
trader to place 12–18% of one standard deviation more afternoon trades than
normal (Panel A), place afternoon trades that are 7–11% of one standard devi-
ation larger than normal (Panel B), and assume total dollar risk which is up to
1.6% of a standard deviation larger than normal (Panel C). The economic sig-
nificance of morning profits in explaining afternoon total dollar risk (Panel C)
is lower than that using other risk measures. The regressions using average
afternoon trade size (Panel B) include somewhat fewer observations than the
others because they only include traders who place at least one afternoon trade.
The fact that traders with profitable mornings place afternoon trades that
are of smaller size than average suggests the results are not entirely driven
by a “framing effect” similar to the taxicab findings of Camerer et al. (1997).
Traders with profitable mornings are not only more likely to stop trading in the
afternoon—those that remain tend to trade less aggressively (in lower sizes)
than normal.
As expected, the inventory terms are highly significant, indicating that
traders with large midday positions assume additional afternoon risk as they
unwind them (or that losing traders are already expanding their positions in
order to assume greater afternoon risk). The morning risk variables are highly
significant as well, indicating that traders who assume significant morning
risk tend to continue to do so in the afternoon. To make sure our results are
not driven by outliers or by the behavior of traders facing margin constraints,
we rerun our regressions on the subset of traders whose morning profits did
not deviate from zero by more than two standard deviations. Under this spec-
ification, which we do not report due to space considerations, the results are
considerably stronger in economic and statistical terms.
A potential concern about our results is that we are measuring losses relative
to zero, not relative to cross-sectional averages. One possibility for how this
might influence the results is as follows. Suppose there is one set of traders
18 Our panel-corrected standard error estimates adjust for contemporaneous correlation and
heteroskedasticity across traders.
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that earn modest profits and assume modest morning and afternoon risk and
there is another set that assumes a large amount of risk in mornings and
afternoons and frequently incurs morning losses. In this case, traders with
morning losses, who are mostly the high-risk traders, take more afternoon risk
than the average trader, since the average trader’s afternoon risk is determined
partially by the low-risk traders. To make sure such an effect is not driving our
results, we compare the afternoon risk-taking of traders with morning losses
to the symmetric group of winners, rather than to all winners. That is, the
fraction of traders that incur morning losses on a given day is compared to the
equivalent fraction of largest winners. For example, if on a given day one-third
of the traders have morning losses, their afternoon risk-taking is compared
to the one-third of the sample that recorded the highest gains that morning.
The results of regressions conducted on the data when it is parsed in this way,
and using afternoon total dollar risk as the dependent variable, are reported in
Panel D. As we can see, the results are highly consistent with those in Panel C.
The point estimates are very close to those in Panel C and the coefficients on
morning profits are significant across all four regression specifications.
One strong assumption in our above regressions is that morning risk-taking
and midday inventory relate to afternoon risk-taking in a linear manner. Con-
sidering the strength of the coefficients on both controls, it may be worth ex-
amining the robustness of the results to the linearity assumption. To do so,
we sort traders on each day into quintiles according to their morning profits
and then, within each quintile, we sort them into quintiles according to morn-
ing risk-taking or morning inventory. Within each of the 25 resulting cells, we
calculate the average afternoon risk-taking across all trader-days. The results
when morning profits are sorted against our three measures of morning risk-
taking are reported in Table III. The results using morning inventory instead of
morning risk-taking are highly similar and therefore are suppressed for brevity.
As Table III demonstrates, the results are highly robust to relaxing the lin-
ear specification. Within each quintile of morning risk-taking, afternoon risk-
taking is monotonically decreasing in the level of morning profits. Regardless of
how or at what level morning risk-taking is measured, traders with low morning
profits assume significantly larger afternoon risk than those with high morning
profits.19
As a final robustness check of our results, in Table IV we conduct logit re-
gressions to see whether a trader’s likelihood of assuming greater-than-average
afternoon risk depends on whether the trader incurred morning losses. Specif-




) = exp X
′β
1 + exp X ′β , (2)
19 The only exception is in the bottom corner of Panel C, where for the highest morning profit and
morning total dollar risk quintiles, we see an upturn in the level of afternoon risk-taking. Since no
such pattern is found in either of the other two measures of risk-taking, we view this to be due to
errors in the inventory measure that accumulate across the trading day (as discussed earlier).
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Table III
Morning Profits and Afternoon Risk-Taking: Double Sorts
This table reports the average afternoon risk-taking by locals at the CBOT when traders are sorted
on each day into bins according to morning profits and morning risk-taking, and where morning
risk-taking is measured as the number of trades, average trade size, and total dollar risk. Traders
are sorted into quintiles according to morning profits and then, within each quintile, are sorted into
quintiles according to morning risk-taking. Afternoon risk-taking measures are then averaged across
traders in each cell. Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables that depend on measures of
inventory are Winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels. The sample contains 82,595 local-days.
Panel A: Afternoon Number of Trades
Morning Number of Trades
Morning Profits 1 (low) 2 3 4 5 (high)
1 (low) −0.0498 0.0359 0.1385 0.1679 0.4264
(0.0226) (0.0199) (0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0197)
2 −0.0639 −0.0218 0.0169 0.145 0.2965
(0.0157) (0.0182) (0.0191) (0.0214) (0.024)
3 −0.1539 −0.0899 −0.0088 0.0288 0.2229
(0.0159) (0.0172) (0.019) (0.0206) (0.0244)
4 −0.2404 −0.1891 −0.0818 −0.0283 0.0852
(0.0182) (0.017) (0.0181) (0.0186) (0.021)
5 (high) −0.2983 −0.2088 −0.1626 −0.0597 0.0578
(0.0227) (0.0189) (0.0184) (0.018) (0.0184)
Panel B: Afternoon Average Trade Size
Morning Average Trade Size
Morning Profits 1 (low) 2 3 4 5 (high)
1 (low) −0.225 −0.0595 0.0865 0.2087 0.4167
(0.0234) (0.0204) (0.0192) (0.0184) (0.0188)
2 −0.1819 −0.1271 −0.0042 0.094 0.2725
(0.0162) (0.0148) (0.0163) (0.0205) (0.0244)
3 −0.1761 −0.1192 −0.0239 0.0695 0.1796
(0.0157) (0.0168) (0.0163) (0.0213) (0.0261)
4 −0.2288 −0.1555 −0.0491 0.0234 0.1799
(0.0174) (0.0172) (0.019) (0.0183) (0.0232)
5 (high) −0.2905 −0.2054 −0.075 0.0471 0.1915
(0.0222) (0.0191) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0207)
Panel C: Afternoon Total Dollar Risk
Morning Total Dollar Risk
Morning Profits 1 (low) 2 3 4 5 (high)
1 (low) −0.3069 −0.2571 −0.1572 0.054 1.0201
(0.0163) (0.0075) (0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0081)
2 −0.4177 −0.344 −0.2171 −0.0334 0.5934
(0.0125) (0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0064) (0.0091)
3 −0.4461 −0.3432 −0.2362 −0.0559 0.4879
(0.0112) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0091)
4 −0.462 −0.3522 −0.2495 −0.041 0.5967
(0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0114)
5 (high) −0.4879 −0.3701 −0.257 0.0038 1.1277
(0.0159) (0.0274) (0.0276) (0.0255) (0.0191)
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Table IV
Binary Results for Morning Profits and Afternoon Risk-Taking
This table reports the results of a number of different logit models relating morning profits to af-
ternoon risk-taking by locals at the CBOT. All models measure both morning profits and afternoon
risk in a binary form, and the logit models have the basic form,
Prob (RISKAi,t > 0) =
exp X ′β
1 + exp X ′β ,
where












∣∣∣ + βRRISKMi,t .
The t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables that depend on measures of inventory are
Winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels. In Panel D, only the top (i.e., most profitable) X% of all traders
on a given day is included in the regression, where X is the fraction of traders with losses on that
day. In Panels A through C, the sample contains 82,595 local-days. In Panel D the sample contains
65,061 local-days.
Method α βπ βI βπI βR
Panel A: Prob(Afternoon Number of Trades > Mean Trades)
Pooled logit 0.375 −0.2875 −0.0801 0.0537 −0.3865
(1384.93) (−286.97) (−41.82) (11.71) (−2107.91)
FM by trader 0.2766 −0.1989 −0.3139 0.3088 −0.4017
(1.54) (−1.02) (−1.11) (1.11) (−14.87)
FM by date 0.553 −0.3466 −0.0947 0.0844 −0.331
(8.58) (−11.45) (−4.48) (1.88) (−17.94)
Panel B: Prob(Afternoon Average Trade Size > Mean Size)
Pooled logit 0.4581 −0.1528 −0.1083 0.0118 −0.4223
(2015.13) (−78.94) (−71.54) (0.51) (−2070.04)
FM by trader 0.6396 −0.3140 0.1272 −0.2697 −0.488
(4.39) (−2.07) (0.60) (−1.27) (−15.99)
FM by date 0.5192 −0.2012 −0.1183 −0.0111 −0.3615
(15.59) (−8.8) (−6.11) (−0.39) (−26.17)
Panel C: Prob(Afternoon Total Dollar Risk > Mean Risk)
Pooled logit −0.9595 0.2032 2.0773 −0.5024 1.4089
(−70.18) (9.34) (67.1) (−11.6) (60.03)
FM by trader −0.7171 0.0572 4.4364 1.1028 1.6801
(−18.74) (0.97) (11.52) (1.35) (20.21)
FM by date −0.9726 0.191 2.516 −0.4388 1.5145
(−31.06) (6.57) (30.94) (−5.12) (36.12)
Panel D: Regressions Requiring Matched Percentiles of Winners and Losers
Prob(Afternoon Total Dollar Risk > Mean Risk)
Pooled logit −0.9001 0.146 2.1477 −0.5587 1.3616
(−55.94) (6.27) (59.45) (−11.92) (54.82)
FM by trader −0.7107 0.056 6.1548 −0.7123 1.7579
(−11.00) (0.70) (10.91) (−0.80) (15.81)
FM by date −0.9124 0.1354 2.693 −0.6009 1.4724
(−26.96) (4.43) (28.95) (−6.02) (37.2)
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where
X ′β = α − βπ I
(
πMi,t < 0
) + βI |INVMi,t




∣∣ + βRRISKMi,t , (3)
and where I(πMi,t < 0) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if trader i’s
morning profit on date t is negative. Note that the term −βπI(πMi,t < 0) enters
the regression equation with a negative sign in order to make the expected sign
of the coefficients negative under loss aversion.
Again, the morning losses enter significantly in almost all regressions. The
fact that the Fama–MacBeth regression by date yields consistently stronger
estimates than the regression by trader (as was the case in Table II) implies that
our results are driven more by the profits/risk-taking relation across traders
on particular days than by the relation across days for particular traders. Our
binary results also offer an alternate estimate of the economic significance of
our results. Using the pooled logit regressions from Table III, and evaluating
them with independent variables at their means, traders that lose money in the
morning increase their probability of assuming above-average afternoon risk
from 26.9 to 31.3%. This represents an increase in likelihood of slightly more
than 16%. Overall, Tables II–IV make a strong case that market makers at the
CBOT behave in a loss-averse manner.
C. Semiparametric Regressions
In their calibrations of loss-averse utility functions, Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979) estimate that individual utility functions have a kink at zero and
convexity over losses that is roughly equal to their concavity over gains. To in-
vestigate whether the afternoon responses of traders with morning losses are
symmetric to those with morning gains, we conduct a series of semiparametric
regressions that permit a nonlinear relationship between morning returns and
afternoon risk-taking. Specifically, we rank traders each day according to their
normalized morning profit and assign them to one of 20 profitability groups.20
We then conduct daily cross-sectional regressions of the following form:
RISKAi,t = α +
20∑
j=1





βπ I , j Di, j ,t ·
∣∣INVMi,t
∣∣
+ βRRISKMi,t + εi,t , (4)
where Di,j,t is a dummy variable that is equal to one if trader i’s morning profit
ranks in group j on date t. We then average the cross-sectional regression coef-
ficients across time and calculate the corresponding standard errors. Figure 1
plots the average of the morning profit regression coefficients for each of the
20 profit percentile groups when total afternoon dollar risk is used as the
20 To ensure that the zero-profit level does not move around across the year, we create the
profitability bins using the entire year of morning profit observations.
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Figure 1. Morning profit percentile and afternoon risk-taking. This figure plots the time-
series averages of 236 daily cross-sectional semiparametric regressions of afternoon total dollar risk
on morning profit percentile. The regressions are kernel-smoothed and the dashed lines reflect two
standard error bands of the time series-averaged regressions.
dependent variable. A kernel-smoothed line is plotted across these coefficients
and two standard error bands are included to reflect significance.
The figure highlights a significant asymmetry between the responses of
traders with profitable mornings and those with losing mornings. Consistent
with the above results, traders with losing mornings increase their afternoon
risk-taking significantly. Moreover, the smaller the morning losses, the smaller
the increase in afternoon risk-taking. The relationship holds up until around
the 30th percentile of morning profitability. Given that this is the point in the
ranking where the traders earn zero profits, it is highly consistent with the
findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who estimate that utility functions
shift at zero from convex to concave with a kink.
As we move into the positive range of trader morning profitability, the picture
changes. Traders with profitable mornings all take on relatively similar, below-
average, levels of afternoon risk. Only traders who experience extremely high
profits differ at all in their afternoon risk-taking. Traders in the final few per-
centiles exhibit a slight increase in their afternoon risk-taking. This increase
could be consistent with a house-money effect; however, the increase is not
statistically significant, and is economically much smaller than the increased
risk-taking of traders with losing mornings. Moreover, this increase does not
appear in the double sorts of trade size or number of trades in Table III. Thus,
it appears that the relation between morning profitability and afternoon risk-
taking is not symmetric, with losing trader behavior being more sensitive to
the level of their losses than winning traders to the level of their gains.
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D. Time until Midday Position Unwound
The findings of Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998a), and Locke and
Mann (1999) all suggest that traders may be subject to the disposition effect.
That is, they may be more reluctant to unwind losing positions than winning
positions. Our results thus far indicate that traders who lose money in the
mornings assume greater afternoon risk. To investigate the extent to which
this is driven by trader reluctance to unwind losing midday positions, we em-
ploy a hazard model to estimate the time traders take to unwind their midday
inventory.
The hazard model we employ is the Cox proportional hazard model. In this
model, the instantaneous probability of unwinding a position, conditional on
not having unwound the position until now, is given by the hazard rate, which
we model as















where h0(τ ) is a baseline hazard function, τ measures the time since 11 a.m. on
day t, PMt is the futures contract price at 11 a.m. on day t, P¯
I
i,t is the contract-
weighted average price at which trader i acquired his inventory on day t, and
the other variables are as defined above. We do not estimate the baseline haz-
ard function, but we estimate the coefficients on the terms that shift the base-
line hazard up and down for particular individuals. Since we are modeling the
time required to reverse a position at midday, the baseline hazard function cap-
tures the unconditional probability of position reversal at each instant between
11:00 a.m. and market close at 2:00 p.m., including any effect of the time of day.
Given the proportional hazard form, a positive coefficient on a particular vari-
able increases the hazard for unwinding a position, shortening the time until
unwinding the position as the explanatory variable increases. Thus, to be con-
sistent with the disposition effect, we expect the value of the coefficient on value
(βV ) to be positive. The results are reported in Table V.
Beginning with the pooled regression results, we see that both position value
and morning profits are highly significant in explaining the speed at which
midday positions are unwound. Consistent with the disposition effect, traders
that take a losing position into the afternoon tend to take longer to unwind it
than those with a winning position. For example, a trader that has a 30 contract
position that is under water by one tick will lower his hazard rate, on average,
by 2.9%. However, a trader’s overall morning profits also help explain how long
the trader takes to unwind his midday position. If the same trader enters the
afternoon with overall morning profits that are one standard deviation below
zero, he has a hazard rate that is an additional 3.3% lower (for a total decrease
of 6.2%) than if he had no morning losses overall. Since a trader wishing to
assume greater afternoon risk can either trade in larger quantities or hold
existing positions longer, this result is perfectly consistent with the loss-averse
behavior documented above.
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Table V
Hazard Model for Time until Midday Position Unwound
This table reports the results of a Cox proportional hazard model measuring the time it takes
traders to unwind positions they have at 11:00 a.m. conditional on their morning profit or loss and
the value of their position. Specifically, the hazard rate for reversing a given position is
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where h0(t) is a baseline hazard function, PMt is the futures price at 11 a.m. on day t, and P¯
I
i,t is the
contract-weighted average price at which trader i acquired his inventory on day t. The t-statistics
are in parentheses. All variables (except time to unwind) are Winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels.
The sample contains 82,595 local-days.
Method βV βπ βI βR
Dependent Variable: Time until Midday Position Unwound
Pooled Cox model 0.0283 0.0321 −0.0094 −0.0158
(5.11) (5.49) (−1.82) (−1.13)
FM by trader 0.0187 0.0178 −0.1067 −0.4013
(0.90) (1.11) (−1.50) (−1.44)
FM by date 0.0312 0.0577 −0.0042 −0.0155
(6.54) (4.83) (−0.37) (−1.36)
For robustness, we estimate the hazard model for each trader and then av-
erage the coefficients across traders. We estimate the hazard model on each
day of our sample and then average the coefficients across days. Although the
signs and magnitudes are all consistent with the pooled regression, the stan-
dard errors of our estimates become much larger when we average the coeffi-
cients across traders. Only when we estimate the model on each day and then
average across days do the coefficients retain their statistical significance. In
unreported robustness checks, we estimated a single-variable hazard model for
each of the above explanatory variables. When inventory is the only explanatory
variable, its sign is, as one would expect, positive and highly significant. When
the value of the position is the only variable included, its coefficient estimate is
unchanged from the multivariate model, suggesting that correlation between
the value of the midday position and overall morning profits is not distorting
our results.
E. Profits and Risk-Taking across Days
As we have argued, there are compelling institutional and behavioral factors
that justify a 1-day horizon for our traders. However, it is possible that all
traders do not exclusively evaluate their profits at the daily horizon and that
other horizons are important. One of the important aspects of testing at a daily
horizon in our setting is that because traders seldom enter the trading day
with outstanding positions, our traders can attribute their performance during
the morning entirely to trades executed that morning. Although this possibility
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disappears if we test at an hourly horizon, it does not if we move to the multiday
setting—profits earned during a particular day can be attributed entirely to
decisions made that day. Thus, to see whether our findings are exclusive to the
1-day horizon, or whether they are detectable at lower frequencies, we examine
the relationship between profits and risk-taking across trading days.
To examine profits and risk-taking across days, we compare overlapping pairs
of trader-days. Specifically, we ask whether profits on one day explain a trader’s
level of risk-taking the next. An attractive feature of the multiday setting is that
unlike the morning–afternoon tests, we do not need to worry about a trader
having an outstanding position following a losing day that influences our mea-
surement of his risk-taking activity on the following day. Since we assume that
traders hold no position overnight, inventory is always zero at the beginning
of each day and traders must enter trades to incur risk. We estimate the re-
gressions employed above without the inventory controls, simply regressing a
trader’s level of daily risk on his previous day’s profit and previous day’s risk.
As in the earlier tests, we again normalize the profit and risk measures by
traders, though we now use daily averages and standard deviations.
Daily regressions of risk-taking on profits corresponding to those presented
in Tables II and IV were conducted. When we use continuous measures of risk
and profits (as in Table II), no detectable relationship exists between profit
and risk across trading days, whether we run pooled OLS, panel, or Fama–
MacBeth style regressions. Likewise, when we employ discrete measures of
risk and profits (as in Table IV), the results are consistently insignificant. To
conserve space, we do not report the results of these regressions. They suggest,
however, that horizon effects can be quite important in identifying loss-averse
behavior, and that for our set of traders, loss aversion is only pronounced at the
daily horizon.
IV. Evidence for Price Impact
Having documented strong evidence supporting the hypothesis of loss aver-
sion among our traders, we now turn to the question of whether this loss aver-
sion matters for prices. The second hypothesis that we examine relates each
trader’s performance in the morning to his probability of setting prices in the
afternoon. In particular, we examine whether traders with morning losses tend
to buy or sell when the price moves up or down. Our third hypothesis concerns
the permanence of the prices set by traders with losses. We estimate the ex-
pected price 10 minutes after a price change, conditional on whether the trader
that moved the prices had losses or gains in the morning. Our final hypoth-
esis relates aggregate morning losses to afternoon volatility. We test whether
mornings with widespread losses lead to more volatile afternoons.
A. Morning Profits and Afternoon Price Leadership
We begin by identifying trades placed by locals that move the price in a di-
rection consistent with their trade. In a futures pit, traders do not post bid and
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ask prices as market makers do on an exchange floor. Rather, a group of traders
stands ready to buy at a particular price, and a group stands ready to sell at
a different, higher price. When large buy orders arrive from customers outside
the pit, the orders generally are filled at the higher price. Large sales orders
similarly go through at the lower price. The posted futures price therefore os-
cillates between the effective bid and ask price throughout the day. We identify
trades that cause the posted price to change from bid to ask (or from ask to bid)
because of the purchase or sale of a local trader for his own account. Specifi-
cally, we compare the price of a given local trade to the price of the previous
trade. If the local purchases at a price that is higher than the previous price,
we identify the trade as responsible for having raised the price. Likewise, if the
local sells at a price that is lower than the previous price, we identify the trade
as responsible for lowering the price. Although the actual bid and ask prices at
a given point in time are not recorded by the CBOT, under conditions when they
are well defined for market participants, price-setting trades resemble market
orders. Locals do not execute price-setting trades very frequently. In order to be
certain that an identified price move is caused by a local, we drop any trade that
occurs during the same second as another trade. Across all locals and days, the
average number of price-moving trades per afternoon is 0.327 per trader, for a
total of around 140 price-moving trades executed by locals on a given afternoon.
Having identified trades that have moved the price, we then ask whether
traders place more price-moving trades following losing mornings than follow-
ing profitable mornings. Specifically, we regress the number of price-setting
trades placed by a trader on a given afternoon (relative to his average) on the




¯Ai = α + βππMi,t + βI
∣∣INVMi,t
∣∣ + βπ IπMi,t ·
∣∣INVMi,t
∣∣ + εit , (6)
where 
Ai,t is the number of price-setting trades placed in the afternoon of day t
by trader i, 
¯Ai is trader i’s average number of price-setting trades per afternoon,
and other variables are as defined earlier.
The results of pooled OLS, fixed effects, and Fama–MacBeth style cross-
sectional and time-series regressions are reported in Table VI. Panel A reports
the results for all trades. Panels B and C report regression results in which
price-setting trades are separated into those that are inventory-expanding and
inventory-contracting, respectively. In all specifications, the results are highly
significant. A trader who experiences a one standard deviation loss in the morn-
ing places between 0.047 and 0.061 more afternoon price-setting trades than
he does on an average afternoon. Since traders only place 0.327 price-setting
trades per afternoon, the results are economically significant. Experiencing a
one standard deviation morning loss increases the average number of afternoon
price-setting trades by between 20 and 25%. In Panels B and C, we see that
traders with morning losses are more likely to place price-setting trades in the
afternoon to both reduce as well as expand their inventory. Consistent with
the earlier results on average afternoon trade size, these results suggest that
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Table VI
Morning Profits and Afternoon Price Leadership
This table reports the results of a number of different regressions relating afternoon risk-taking to
afternoon price leadership by locals at the CBOT. All regressions have the basic form,

Ai,t − 
¯Ai = α + βππMi,t + βI
∣∣∣INVMi,t
∣∣∣ + βπ I πMi,t ·
∣∣∣INVMi,t
∣∣∣ + εi,t ,
where 
Ai,t is the number of price-setting trades made by trader i on the afternoon of date t. This
is compared to its average level for trader i, 
¯Ai , and then regressed on the explanatory variables
used above. All variables that depend on measures of inventory are Winsorized at the 1 and 99%
levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Regressions on an indicator variable that is equal to 1
when morning profits are positive result in qualitatively identical inferences, as do ordered logit
regressions with fixed effects by trader.
Dependent Variable: Afternoon Number of Price-Setting Trades (
Ai,t − 
¯Ai )
Method α βπ βI βπI
Panel A: All Trades
Pooled OLS 0.0014 −0.0493 0.0057 −0.024
(0.81) (−18.37) (2.89) (−12.88)
FM by trader −0.0014 −0.0474 0.0076 −0.0203
(−1.05) (−10.21) (2.74) (−6.58)
FM by date 0.0493 −0.061 0.0072 −0.0119
(3.58) (−15.45) (3.11) (−4.19)
Fixed effects PCSE – −0.0484 0.0083 −0.0145
– (−15.87) (3.81) (−6.95)
Panel B: Inventory Expanding Trades
Pooled OLS 0.0010 −0.0251 0.0007 −0.0189
(0.08) (−13.80) (0.55) (−14.50)
FM by trader −0.0004 −0.0239 0.0026 −0.0176
(−0.54) (−8.51) (1.27) (8.01)
FM by date 0.0508 −0.0311 0.0039 −0.0112
(3.72) (−11.65) (2.58) (−4.98)
Fixed effects PCSE – −0.0240 0.0028 −0.0118
– (−12.05) (2.00) (−8.41)
Panel C: Inventory Contracting Trades
Pooled OLS 0.0013 −0.0291 0.0008 −0.018
(1.01) (−15.69) (0.59) (−13.66)
FM by trader −0.0008 −0.0274 0.0028 −0.0153
(−1.00) (−9.53) (1.42) (−6.82)
FM by date 0.0524 −0.0364 0.0019 −0.0128
(3.76) (−13.46) (1.11) (−5.51)
Fixed effects PCSE – −0.0278 0.0027 −0.0109
– (−13.69) (0.06) (−7.72)
traders who incur morning losses are not passively assuming more afternoon
risk. To obtain the additional risk, they appear to be frequently hitting existing
limit orders at prices that are less favorable than those of previous trades. This
implies that traders with morning losses cannot easily assume the additional
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afternoon risk they desire and must give up an edge to obtain the additional
exposure. Again, the results are highly significant across all the regression spec-
ifications, and appear strong both in the time series and in the cross-section.
The results also obtain if binary specifications of morning profit and afternoon
risk-taking replace the continuous variables used in Table VI, or if an ordered
logit model with trader-specific fixed effects replaces the demeaned regression
specification reported here.
While a subset of the afternoon trades of traders with losing mornings ap-
pears to move prices, if they are motivated by loss aversion, the price impact of
such trades should be less permanent than that of trades that are information
based. Moreover, given that these traders are likely to unwind their positions
as the day progresses, we should expect the price impact of position-initiating
trades to disappear as the day moves forward. We investigate these issues in
the following section.
B. Loss Aversion and Price Permanence
The price-setting trades we identify in the previous section appear to be
motivated by loss-averse traders eager to assume additional afternoon risk to
improve their odds of recovering morning losses. If this is indeed the case, and
the trades are not based on information about the fundamental value of the fu-
tures contract, we should expect them to have a more transitory impact on prices
than trades based on information. Moreover, an examination of the quality of
price-setting trades placed by loss-averse traders gives us a further idea about
their afternoon trade performance in relation to their morning profitability. To
pursue this, we compare the price permanence of price-setting trades placed by
traders with morning losses to those placed by traders with morning profits.
If afternoon trades placed by traders with profitable mornings are more likely
to be informed trades than those placed by traders with losing mornings, we
should expect the prices set by profitable traders to be far more permanent
than those set by traders trying to recover their losses.
To examine the price permanence of our traders’ price-setting trades, we
divide the trades according to the price sequence leading up to the price-setting
trade. Trades are grouped according to the sequence generated by the past four
price ticks. Interpreting the tick-by-tick price rises and declines symmetrically,
we denote a price change as a continuation (C) if it is in the same direction as
the previous price change and as a reversal (R) if it is not. For example, the
price sequence 25-24-25-26 would be denoted as RC since the second 25 results
in a reversal (25-24-25) and the 26 is a continuation (24-25-26). Thus four past
prices yield four distinct change categories: CC, CR, RC, and RR. Clearly, RR
is the most common of the four possibilities (77% of the price-setting trades)
followed by CR (15%), RC (7%), and CC (1%).
Price-setting trades are further divided according to whether they resulted
in a contraction or an expansion of the trader’s existing position and according
to whether or not the trader experienced a loss in the morning. Reversals are
then averaged within each category according to the fraction of the price-setting
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Table VII
Price Reversals
This table reports the average price reversals that follow the price-setting trades placed by the
traders in our sample. Price reversals are measured as the fraction of the price-setting trade’s
price change that is reversed during the next 5 minutes. The price-setting trades are divided
according to the price path sequence leading up to the trade. The first column identifies the price
path sequence of the last four trades, with C denoting a continuation and R denoting a reversal.
For example, if one of our traders places the final trade in the sequence 25-24-25-26, this would
be included in the category RC. Price-setting trades are further divided according to whether the
trade resulted in an expanded or contracted inventory for the trader and whether or not the trader
experienced a morning loss. Differences between the price reversals that follow price-setting trades
of traders with morning losses and those with no morning loss are recorded in columns 4 and 7.
The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Five-Minute Price Changes in Ticks
Contracting Expanding
Price Path Loss No Loss Diff. Loss No Loss Diff.
CC 2.0000 2.0211 −0.0211 3.5411 1.5040 2.0371
(3.3) (5.7) (0.0) (4.4) (2.2) (1.9)
RC 2.0365 1.8333 0.2032 2.5165 1.9667 0.5498
(16.1) (21.0) (1.3) (15.5) (22.6) (3.0)
CR 0.8141 0.6806 0.1334 0.8211 0.6883 0.1328
(9.2) (10.4) (1.2) (7.0) (11.2) (1.0)
RR 0.6640 0.7350 −0.0710 0.8461 0.6950 0.1510
(19.7) (27.2) (−1.6) (20.3) (28.9) (3.1)
Average 0.8035 0.8166 −0.0131 1.0122 0.7967 0.2155
(25.7) (33.8) (−0.3) (25.4) (35.6) (4.7)
trade’s price change that is reversed during the subsequent 5 minutes. The
average 5-minute reversal for each of our categories is reported in Table VII.
Highly similar results emerge when the window is reduced to 1 minute or
extended to 10 minutes.
Overall, all reversal averages are significantly different from zero. The aver-
age reversal is around 0.8. Given the nature of trading in the CBOT futures pit,
these averages are economically sensible. The effective bid–ask spread of the
CBOT T-Bond futures pit is generally less than one price tick. This implies that
when the price moves, it almost always does so by just one tick. Large purchases
move the price up one tick, while large sales move it down a tick. Therefore,
short-run prices are extremely mean reverting. When the price-setting trade re-
sults in a continuation (RC or CC), the reversal is significantly larger than one
tick, indicating that continuations are generally reversed after several minutes.
Examining price-setting trades that contract the trader’s existing position,
we see little difference between the reversals that follow trades set by traders
with morning losses and those with morning gains. The range is from −0.07 to
0.20 and the average (weighted according to frequency) is −0.01, although none
of the differences are statistically significant. This implies that, relative to the
average price 5 minutes into the future, traders with morning losses do not
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unwind their positions at significantly worse prices than those with morning
gains.
If we focus on the price-setting trades of traders that expand their exist-
ing positions a different picture emerges. During the 5 minutes that follow
their trades, traders with no morning losses witness a similar reversal in price
to that of traders closing out their positions. However, traders with morning
losses experience a significantly larger price reversal. Their trades reverse be-
tween 0.15 and 2.04 ticks more than those with no morning loss. All but the CR
category achieves statistical significance. Across all position-expanding price-
setting trades, traders with morning losses see their trades reverse 0.22 more
than those with no morning loss. This means that a trader with morning losses
will see, on average, his price-setting trade reverse 27% more over the following
5 minutes than that placed by a trader with no morning loss.
The results of Table VII make it clear that the prices set by traders with losses
in the morning are reversed much more dramatically than those set by traders
with gains in the morning. Using estimates from this and the previous section,
we can now perform some simple calculations to gauge the possible impact of
biases on prices. We find that the average trader with morning losses places
approximately 25% more price-setting trades than an equivalent trader with
morning gains. We also find that traders with morning losses experience price
reversals that are 27% larger than the reversals of other traders. Thus, the
increased price-setting trades placed by losing traders appear to be completely
offset by their reduced price impact. Whether this is the case at the aggregate
level is a question we address later.
The above results lead to several important inferences. First, because the
trades of losing traders have only a temporary impact on prices, other traders
in the pit appear to regard them as noise trades, and trade aggressively against
them. Any impact of the traders’ behavioral biases on prices appears to be
rapidly eliminated by other market participants. Interestingly, the differences
are only pronounced for traders expanding their positions. This implies that
winning and losing traders are equally inclined to yield an edge when un-
winding their positions and that the pit views these trades as equivalently
uninformed. Other traders are therefore inclined to trade against unwinding
winners and losers equally. It also highlights that when loss-averse traders
are proactively taking on additional afternoon risk by expanding their posi-
tions that their price impact is ephemeral. The pit appears particularly eager
to move against traders who expand their afternoon position in order to re-
cover morning losses. Because the prices set by losing traders are reversed
so dramatically, trading to make up morning losses is costly. Thus, Table VII
provides strong evidence confirming that loss aversion is driving the behavior
documented above.
C. Aggregate Morning Losses and Afternoon Price Volatility
In our final set of tests, we ask whether the price-setting trades executed by
locals with morning losses cause afternoon prices to be more volatile than they
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would be if locals had no behavioral biases. This line of inquiry is prompted by
the above trader level results, in which loss aversion leads on the one hand to
greater afternoon risk-seeking and increased placement of price-moving trades,
and on the other hand to increased reversal in prices set by traders attempt-
ing to make up morning losses. If the former effects dominate, we should see
afternoon volatility increase following mornings with widespread losses. If the
price reversals are most important, we should see little increase in afternoon
volatility.21
Our measure of price volatility is the standard deviation of price changes
measured at 1-second, 1-minute, 5-minute, 10-minute, and half-day frequen-
cies. Like in our other regressions, we demean each measure of price volatility
and normalize it by its standard deviation. To investigate our volatility hy-
pothesis, we regress normalized afternoon volatility on the volatility in the
corresponding morning and on several measures of the prevalence of morning
losses among local traders. Specifically, our regressions are as follows:
σAh,t = α + βσσMh,t + βλλMt + εt , (7)
where σAh,t measures the abnormal volatility of afternoon price changes on date
t measured at frequency h, σAh,t measures the abnormal volatility of morning
price changes on date t measured at frequency h, and λMt measures aggregate
morning losses on day t.
Measuring aggregate morning losses is not a simple task because it is not
clear how losses should aggregate. Therefore, we choose several different ways
to aggregate losses. First, we simply calculate the fraction of locals with losses
at 11:00 a.m. Second, we calculate the average of πMi,t across traders each day.
Since our regression relates aggregate risk to aggregate losses, the sample size
is limited to the 236 trading days in our data. Also, because serial correlation
may be a problem in our sample, all the estimates we report are adjusted to
account for first-order autocorrelation. Neither average losses nor the fraction
of traders with losses is significantly related to afternoon volatility at any fre-
quency. Since none of these regressions produce significant results, we do not
report the results in a table.
Neither of the measures described above considers the prevalence of losses
among traders who are particularly loss-averse. Since there is substantial vari-
ation in the degree of loss aversion among traders, it is likely that measures of
aggregate losses that consider which traders lose predict afternoon volatility
more accurately. We construct two such measures by considering each trader’s
coefficients on morning profits in regressions (3) and (6). We consider a trader
to be loss averse if his morning profit coefficient in equation (3) is negative
(i.e., βπ < 0). Thus, if a trader tends to take above-average afternoon total dol-
lar risk when he has lost in the morning, he is classified as loss-averse. Using
21 There may be other reasons to expect little increase in afternoon volatility following morning
losses. Odean (1998b) predicts that when market makers are more overconfident and therefore
more risk-tolerant, volatility should be lower. Grinblatt and Han (2002) find that a disposition
effect can generate momentum in stock prices.
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Table VIII
Aggregate Morning Losses and Afternoon Price Changes
This table reports the results of a few time series regressions relating aggregate morning losses to
the volatility of afternoon price changes. All regressions have the basic form,
σMh,t = α + βσ σMh,t + βλλMt + εt ,
where σAh,t measures the volatility of afternoon price changes on date t measured at frequency
h, σAh,t measures the volatility of morning price changes on date t measured at frequency h, and λ
M
t
measures the aggregate fraction of loss-averse traders with morning losses on day t. The aggregate
fraction of loss-averse traders that have experienced morning losses on a given day is measured
by taking traders whose coefficient βπ is negative in equation (3) (or (6) for our second measure)
and recording the fraction that have experienced a loss. The sample size is 236 trading days. All
estimates are corrected for first-order autocorrelation, and t-statistics are in parentheses.
λMt = Fraction of λMt = Fraction of
Loss-Averse Traders w/Losses Loss-Averse Price Leaders w/Losses
Frequency α βσ βλ α βσ βλ
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Afternoon Volatility (σAh,t)
One second −0.7 0.4 2.09 −0.77 0.39 2.37
(−1.99) (6.73) (2.01) (−2.07) (6.67) (2.09)
One minute −0.62 0.2 1.87 −0.86 0.19 2.65
(−1.69) (3.18) (1.72) (−2.2) (3.13) (2.24)
Five minutes −0.62 0.31 1.90 −0.75 0.3 2.34
(−1.75) (5.09) (1.8) (−1.98) (4.96) (2.03)
Ten minutes −0.39 0.23 1.17 −0.45 0.23 1.39
(−1.06) (3.72) (1.08) (−1.15) (3.64) (1.17)
Half day 0.61 0.12 0.81 0.44 0.1 1.40
(1.7) (1.7) (0.7) (1.16) (1.48) (1.12)
this, our measure of aggregate morning losses is simply the fraction of loss-
averse traders that have experienced losses each morning. Similarly, using
equation (6), we can consider a trader to be a loss-averse price leader if his
morning profit coefficient in equation (6) is negative (βπ < 0)—that is, if he
tends to make more price-setting trades when he has lost in the morning. Us-
ing this, we then measure aggregate morning losses as the fraction of loss-
averse price leaders that have experienced losses each morning. We estimate
equation (7) using both of these loss measures at each of the frequencies that
we consider. The results are reported in Table VIII.
Table VIII contains evidence suggesting that afternoon price volatility is re-
lated to morning market maker profitability. Both measures of morning losses—
the fraction of loss-averse traders that are morning losers and the fraction of
price leaders that are morning losers—yield similarly significant results. At
the 1-second frequency, the coefficients are positive and significant in statis-
tical and economic terms. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction
of traders that are loss-averse losers (0.055) leads to an 11.5% increase in
expected afternoon second-by-second volatility. This is consistent with the
results in Table VI, since traders with morning losses place additional
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price-setting afternoon trades to assume additional risk. As we move to the
1- and 5-minute frequencies, the statistical and economic significance of the
results remains approximately the same, with the price leader measure in-
creasing in magnitude and the loss-averse measure declining. When volatility
is measured over 10 minutes or over the entire afternoon, the results lose much
of their economic significance, and as a result, all statistical significance. A
one standard deviation decrease in the fraction of traders that are loss-averse
losers now leads only to a 4.4% increase in overall afternoon volatility.
Consistent with Table VI, this result suggests that traders with morning
losses create only short-term afternoon deviations from fundamentals. To see
this, consider the impact on volatility of risk-seeking trades that have a tempo-
rary impact on prices in a setting where fundamentals follow a random walk.
Measured over short horizons, the impact on volatility is likely to be large, as
risk-seeking traders move prices considerably relative to fundamentals shocks.
However, measured over longer horizons the risk-seeking trades are likely to be
relatively less important for volatility, since the shocks to the true price process
accumulate over time, but the price impact of the risk-seeking trades—because
they lead to reversals—does not. Thus, although loss-averse traders may have a
short-term influence on prices, consistent with the results in Table VI, their in-
fluence largely appears to have disappeared 10 minutes following their trades.
However, it is important to note that while there appears to be a relationship
between morning losses and afternoon volatility that is consistent with our ear-
lier findings, the results are far from conclusive. Since our tests employ only a
single observation per day, our regressions have limited power.
V. Conclusion
Although behavioral finance has recently become a rather popular area for
asset pricing research, relatively little empirical evidence exists to directly sup-
port behavioral theories and assumptions. This is due in part to the fact that
behavioral models cannot be tested as easily as traditional asset pricing mod-
els. Because aggregate consumption data or market returns data reflect the
decisions of both rational and behaviorally biased traders, the standard tests
of restrictions imposed by the Euler equations of rational, utility-maximizing
agents are inapplicable. Proper assessment of behavioral theories requires de-
tailed information on the trading strategies of various market participants, and
until recently, such information has been difficult to come by.
This paper offers a detailed look at the trading behavior of a set of profes-
sional market makers and directly tests both for biases in their behavior and for
the consequences such biases may have for prices. Our traders are highly proxi-
mate to the price-setting process and they generally close out their positions by
the end of each trading day, providing a clean horizon over which they can
evaluate their performance. These factors give us significant power to identify
conditions under which behavioral biases are likely to be important in influ-
encing prices.
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We find strong evidence that our traders are loss averse. They assume signif-
icantly more afternoon risk following morning losses than following morning
gains. In their eagerness to assume greater afternoon risk, they place price-
setting trades more frequently, purchasing contracts at higher prices, and sell-
ing contracts at lower prices. However, afternoon prices set by traders with
morning losses reverse substantially more than those set by traders with morn-
ing gains. This suggests that any price impact resulting from traders’ behavioral
biases dissipates extremely quickly. Consistent with this, we find that morn-
ings with widespread losses lead to increases in short-run afternoon volatility
but no increase in volatility measured over longer intervals.
Because of the nature of the data, market, and trader horizons, most of our
power to detect effects on prices is concentrated at the microstructure level. In
its focus on professional traders in a large and liquid capital market, our paper
should be viewed as an exploration of the extent to which limits to arbitrage
hold in such settings. Considering the speed with which the price effects of
our loss-averse traders are reversed, limits to arbitrage do not appear to delay
the elimination of behaviorally induced mispricing in our setting. Future work
should investigate the extent to which this remains the case as trader horizons
grow longer and prices are set with less liquidity.
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